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REFORMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  
 
COMPETING MODELS AND EMERGING TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Akio Otsuka* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Large public corporations are hierarchical organizations.  The 
Board of Directors is generally at the apex of the hierarchy.  Most 
formal legal authority within the corporation is vested in the Board, 
although the Board delegates much of its authority to executive 
officers, who in turn delegate much to middle-level managers, and so 
on down. 
The predominant academic view of corporate law today rests on 
the principal-agent paradigm.  Most corporate law scholarship has 
continued to analyze corporate law in terms of agency relationships, 
as based upon the classic Berle-Means-type separation of ownership 
and control under a dispersed ownership structure.  Corporate law 
places a great deal of authority in the Board.  However, the reality is 
that the CEO wields primacy.  The CEO dominated corporate 
governance system aided in igniting the current economic crisis, 
wherein many CEOs encouraged corporate practices aimed at short-
term share price maximization and ignored long-term risks.  
Corporate law has mechanisms to hold boards accountable for 
gross misuse of their authority.  However, those mechanisms are 
  Corporate 
law must balance authority against accountability, but most of the 
time, in the United States, corporate law strikes that balance in favor 
of authority.  Many corporate law scholars have argued for corporate 
law reforms that give more strength to legal accountability 
mechanisms, such as shareholder voting, shareholder bylaws, or 
derivative suits.  One of the essential normative questions in 
                                                          
* Dean (4/2013-3/2015) and Professor of Law, University of 
Tsukuba Law School; LL.M. 1990, MBA 1991, Southern Methodist 
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corporate law is how the market should balance authority against 
accountability.  
Berle and Means are still correct.  The status quo in a modern 
public corporation is not traditional shareholder primacy, team 
production, or director primacy.  Rather, it is CEO domination.  If 
boards, prior to the financial crisis, had successfully monitored 
serious events, such as the recent financial crisis, by relying on 
independent information, they might have been able to challenge 
their CEOs and executive officers to increase the long-term well-
being and value of their corporations.  The interests of not only 
shareholders but also other corporate constituencies and that of the 
public would be far better served with shareholder primacy. 
Corporate governance reform must focus primarily on promoting the 
long-term well-
interests, and ensuring accountability.  There are various approaches 
to achieving such goals.  
This paper considers the implications of the enlightened 
shareholder value model and other reforms made in the United 
Kingdom (U.K.) and the European Union (E.U.), and proposes 
corporate law reforms that give more strength to accountability 
mechanisms.  Part II describes and analyzes two views of the 
corporation: the agency model and the team production model.  It 
explains why the team production model offers a false account of 
current reality, and then moves to the director primacy model.  Part 
III discusses the functions of a public corporation.  Independent 
monitoring boards currently cannot discover any serious problems 
with the business decisions of executive officers because independent 
directors inevitably rely heavily on corporate officers for information 
used in monitoring tasks.  This also holds true for the director 
primacy model and the team production model.  Part IV proposes a 
corporate governance reform that is embodied in the enlightened 
shareholders value model, which was a part of the 2006 U.K. 
Companies Act and other reforms made in the United Kingdom and 
the E.U.; this suggests that the Board should promote the long-term 
well-
ensuring accountability. 
 
II. BACKGROUND: TWO VIEWS OF THE CORPORATION 
The current discussion related to policy issues on corporate law 
is based on the economic theory of the firm.  Depending upon how 
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we analyze such theories, there are two primary perspectives: the 
agency model and the team production model.  Whereas the former 
emphasizes the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and 
managers, the latter brings other non-shareholder constituencies into 
consideration.  These models are analyzed in a descriptive and 
normative light. 
 
 
The agency view dominates most corporate law scholarship 
today.  In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means were the first to 
empirically identify the strong separation of ownership between 
shareho corporations.1 They 
argued that most public corporations are not operated in the interests 
of their owners, the shareholders, but in the interests of their agents, 
the managers. 2   Around the 1970s, legal scholars developed the 
theory of the firm, based on the economic theories of Ronald Coase 
and other forerunners, which focused primarily on efficiency and the 
production processes.3  
which is now the dominant corporate law theory, a firm is made up 
of various explicit and implicit contracts among 
constituencies.  
various inputs acting together to pro 4  While 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling emphasized the nature of the 
firm as a nexus of contracts5 a center of coordination of productive 
factors consisting of explicit and implicit contracts ,6 the nature of 
                                                          
1 See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
2 See id. at 124. 
3 , THE ECONOMIST, July 27, 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/news/economics-brief/21725542-if-markets-are-
so-good-directing-resources-why-do-companies-exist-first-our. 
4  Stephen M. Bainbridge, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 28 (2008). 
5 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
6 E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991). See generally Armen A. Alchain 
& Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
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the firm as a legal entity is not explained under the terms of the 
theory.  
independent existence.7 Jensen and Meckling then focused on agency 
costs, which the upper-level managers created (who are charged with 
8   The agency costs represent 
conflicts of interest between shareholders, which consist of 
monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual losses that contractual 
mechanisms cannot entirely eliminate. 9   The nexus of contracts 
theory has been influential in shaping corporate law theory over the 
past three decades.10 
This 
nothing about why firms exist or what kind of activity is undertaken 
11  Rather, it is only a theory of agency costs within 
certain types of firms, including corporations.12  If a corporation is 
really no more than a nexus of contracts under the theory, there 
should be no need for corporations or corporate law.  If the notion of 
corporations is not necessary, there is no need for the law to create 
and support them. Thus, the nexus of contracts theory has been 
argued outside of the theory of the firm and as a descriptive model 
for corporate law scholars.  
However, the nexus of contracts theory argues that corporate law 
represents several default contracts that permit the involved parties to 
opt out of these relations through agreement. 13  Consequently, its 
proponents assert that corporate law should be mostly non-mandatory 
to provide private parties with the opportunity to spontaneously order 
                                                          
7 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 311; Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L irm is not a 
 
8 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 311. 
9 Id. at 310-11. 
10 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1 39 (discussing 
the corporate contract); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and 
Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318 27 (1993) (discussing the importance 
and impact of the nexus-of-contracts theory). 
11 Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 
52 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 731 32 (2004). 
12 See Oliver Hart, the Theory of the 
Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1763 65 (1989). 
13 Ulen, supra note 10, at 322. 
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their affairs as they deem appropriate.14  Thus, the proponents of the 
nexus of contracts theory have emphasized the non-mandatory nature 
of corporate law, and they have counseled against changes to the 
status quo based on the contractual nature of that status quo.15 
primac
are assumed to act as the ultimate principals in agency contracts that 
that makes up the firm.16  Directors and officers are treated under 
such contracts as contractual agents of the shareholders, with 
fiduciary obligations to maximize shareholder wealth. 17   Thus, 
according to the nexus of contracts theory, shareholders retain a 
privileged position among the various contracting parties that 
constitute the firm, while the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies remain subordinated. 18   However, it is generally 
acknowledged that shareholder wealth maximization is itself only a 
norm of corporate behavior, rather than a legal rule.19  Indeed, neither 
case law nor corporate statutes impose on directors and officers an 
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. 20   Even in Delaware, 
whose corporate code is less amenable to stakeholder interests than 
many other state corporate statutes, -making 
is not required to maximize shareholder wealth, 
21  
Moreover, the Delaware courts have held that directors and officers 
have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, 
                                                          
14 Id. at 324. 
15 Id. at 322 23 (discussing the overall impact of the theory). 
16 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and 
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 N.W.UNIV. L. REV. 547, 547-48 (2003). 
17 Id. at 548. 
18 Id. 
19 Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L
recognize that shareholder primacy functions more as a norm than an 
enforceable legal r  
20 See Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986); 
Contra, , 571 A.2d 1140, 1145, 1155 
(Del. 1990).  
21 See Fisch, supra 
corporate statute is silent both with respect to the standard by which board 
decisions are evaluated and with respect to the stakeholders, whose interests 
may legitimately be taken into account). 
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and not only in the interests of the shareholders.22  The courts also 
state that f
23   Consequently, courts will not second-guess 
ss judgment that is based on concerns about 
employees, communities, and other non-shareholder constituencies 
without finding a clear breach of fiduciary duty. 
The nexus of contracts theory has attracted considerable critique, 
wherein it is premised on the 
an ideal market comprised of perfectly rational economic decision-
makers.24 Moreover, as stated above, a necessity for corporations or 
corporate law is uncertain under the theory, because the theory is 
only a theory of agency costs and a corporation is no more than a 
nexus of contracts.  Certainly, the fundamental corporate governance 
structures and mechanisms that Berle-Means-type corporations in the 
United States adopted are conceived as static and uniform. However, 
the corporate governance structures in public corporations vary, and 
thereby, there is no ideal stock market as well.  
 
 
Generally, under state corporate statutes, shareholders alone 
enjoy voting rights, information rights, and the right to bring 
derivative suits.  In a series of articles, Margaret Blair and Lynn 
Stout have developed a team production theory of corporate law 
to act as a mediating 
hierarch, balancing the interests of the various corporate 
constituencies.25 
 
                                                          
22 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (overruled 
on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000)).  
23 ., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 
1996); see also, Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938) (
nom. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)). 
24 See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate 
Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 796 (2006). 
25 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 276 87 (1999). 
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1. DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORY 
Like the nexus of contracts theory, the team production model 
views the firm as a series of relationships between various 
constituencies.26  While arguing that the Board of Directors serves as 
the ultimate authority in assigning responsibilities, mediating 
disputes, and distributing profits, Blair and Stout do not claim that 
the goal of the corporation should be shareholder wealth 
maximization. 27  Instead, the corporation is made up of all 
constituencies who are responsible for the business of the enterprise, 
and the directors have a responsibility to all of these constituencies in 
the corporate enterprise.28  
which corporate law actually works in practice is consistent with the 
notion that directors are independent hierarchs whose 
 run [chiefly] to the corporate entity itself and 
29  Thus, directors are 
unique form of fiduciary who most closely resemble trustees.30 
shareholders but to the legal entity of the firm itself. 31   Team 
members submit to the hierarchy and the ownership on their own, as 
this is beneficial for them.32 Blair and Stout argue that shareholders 
are not the only residual risk bearers within a corporation. 33  
Additionally, other corporate constituencies who are also the residual 
risk-bearers frequently make firm-specific investments for example, 
employees specialize their human capital. 34  Such investments are 
obviously essential for the creation of value in the firm.  Therefore, it 
                                                          
26 Id. at 254 (asserting the team production approach 
 
27 Id. at 251. 
28 See id. at 253. 
29 Id. at 289. 
30 Id. at 290-91. 
31 Id. at 274 n.57. 
32 Id. at 274. 
33 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and 
the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 403, 418 
(2001). 
34 See id -even suppliers, 
customers, and communities-also make firm-specific investments that tie 
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seems appropriate and necessary for team members who make firm-
specific investments to delegate exclusive authority to the Board of 
Directors as a mediating hierarch to organize the 
distribute its outputs, and resolve interest conflicts among the team 
members. 35   In a more descriptive manner, each team member 
charges the Board of Directors with (1) mediating among the 
conflicting interests of all the constituencies and (2) protecting all 
-
investment opportunistic behavior by other constituencies. 36   The 
Board of Directors is not a team member and must be independent of 
any of the team members,37 which implies that the Board has no 
expectation of sharing in the value that the team created.  Given the 
firm-specific investments the team members made, the Board serves 
similarly to a trustee38 39) or fiduciary40 for the 
entire firm, but it remains insulated from any direct team member 
control.  
including shareholders, directors are to assume the task of balancing 
conflicting interests and, if necessary, rearranging production 
factors.41  
the interests of the corporation not as shareholder interest, but as the 
aggregate welfare function.42 
 
2. PRECURSOR OF THE THEORY 
deeply dependent 
upon the works of Alchian and Demsetz, and Rajan and Zingales for 
a new school of corporate law and economics based on the theory of 
the firm.43  Blair and Stout discuss the principal-agent and property 
rights approaches and draw comprehensively on the work of Alchian 
                                                          
35 Id. at 421. 
36 See id. 
specific inputs and surplus that results from team produ
of Directors, the team members charge and entrust the Board of Directors 
with these duties). 
37 Id. 
 
38 Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 291. 
39 Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 408. 
40 Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 291. 
41 Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 421. 
42 Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 288 89. 
43 See id. at 265-69 
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and Demsetz in conceptualizing the firm as a method for 
coordinating production.44  Then, they move on to consider the work 
of Holmstrom, 45 Tirole, 46  and Rajan and Zingales 47  in developing 
their own team production model.  
output, either to define or determine each member
48  In accordance with Alchian 
and Demsetz, for team production to be successful, several 
contributors must put forth investments of resources, in certain 
49 
However, it is difficult to define the contribution of each to this 
value.50  A difficulty arises in designing payment schemes as to how 
to counteract the incentives of the team members to shirk since the 
rewarding is not made on the basis of actual individual 
contributions. 51   Alchian and Demsetz argue that monitoring and 
sanctioning generally counteract shirking incentives within team 
production. 52   Individuals have an incentive to free ride on the 
contributions of others, which is disadvantageous for the whole 
team.53  The monitor would be entitled to retain all of the team
produced value, after compensating the other team members for their 
contributions with fixed rewards, which input markets determine.54  
The residual claimant provides the monitor with appropriate 
incentives to assemble a productive team and pay close attention to 
55   Alchian and Demsetz 
maintain that one of the essential characteristics of firms is that they 
solve the problem of shirking through the introduction of a 
centralized contractual agent, that is, an owner-manager or a manager 
                                                          
44 Id. at 265-66. 
45 Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 
(1982). 
46 Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of 
Collusion in Organizations, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1986). 
47 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the 
Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387 (1998). 
48 Alchain & Demsetz, supra note 6, at 779. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 779-81. 
52 Id. at 781-83. 
53 Id. at 779-81. 
54 Id. at 781-83. 
55 Id. at 779-81. 
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who is equipped with the capability of monitoring and the right to 
sanction the behavior of all team members.56 
shareholders in a large public corporation do not, in fact, play such 
an active role as the monitor and residual claimant that the model 
predicts.  Another problem with the model is that it does not consider 
the problems associated with firm-specific investments.57  As Blair 
-
 firm, and 
each group 
explicit contracts. 58   Further, the firm-specific investments, once 
59  These investments reduce 
60 and therefore expose the contributors 
61 
Assuming that the firm is made up of firm-specific investments, 
Rajan and Zingales developed a theory of the firm based on the 
property rights approach in terms of power and access to resources.62  
They further discuss the risks of underinvestment associated with 
firm-specific investments: any party not in control of firm-specific 
investments has an incentive to under invest thereby avoiding a 
controlling party, while firm-specific investments may make it less 
lucrative to sell the property rights to a third party.63 
 
3. CRITIQUE 
Blair and Stout developed their team production model to serve 
both positive and normative purposes.64  They contend that the team 
                                                          
56 Id. 
57 Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 275; see also, e.g., Rajan & 
Zingales, supra note 47; Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and 
Economic Organization, 36 J. L. & ECON. 453 (1993). 
58 Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 275. 
59 Id. at 276. See infra text accompanying notes 64-69. 
60 Id. at 277 79 (observing participants having made firm-specific 
 
61 Id. at 276. 
62 Rajan & Zingales, supra note 47. 
63 Id. at 406 11 (relaxing the assumption that the value of an asset for 
other uses increases at least somewhat with specific investments). 
64 Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 288  289. 
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production model better reflects 
corporation as directors left alone to manage the corporate affairs.65  
According to Blair and Stout, however, the team production model 
requires the Board of Directors to serve all constituencies, rather than 
the shareholders alone.66  They also argue that the model is a better 
positivist approach in that a board balances interests among various 
constituencies in practice as well as a better normative approach.67  
In fact, U.S. corporate law gives directors remarkable discretion to 
and other non-shareholder constituencies.68  Further, statutes in over 
half the states expressly allow boards to weigh non-shareholder 
interests for takeover threats.69  Directors have broad discretion to 
adopt takeover defenses, which allows them to promote other 
sts over short-term shareholder wealth 
maximization.70  The team production model offers incentives for all 
team members and describes the fundamental contracting problem 
that corporate law attempts to resolve. 71   However, the team 
production theory attracted considerable criticism directed at its 
descriptive and normative claims.72 
In terms of the descriptive claim, criticism of the team 
production theory indicates that boards of directors are not in fact 
independent; in reality, management often dominates them even in 
                                                          
65 Id. at 287-319. 
66 Id. at 288. 
67 Id. at 290-92. 
68 Id. at 327-28 n.208. 
69 See id. at 303-04 n.144 (stating that twenty-eight states allow 
directors to consider non-shareholder interests); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A 
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency 
Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 n.1, 587 n.33 (1992) (listing the statutes). 
70 See Fisch, supra note 19, at 651. 
71 Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 327-28.  
72 See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating 
Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. 
L.837 (1999); Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002); David 
Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual - A critique of the Team 
Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000).  Blair & 
see, e.g., Peter C. Kostant, Team 
Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 667 (2002). 
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corporations with a majority of non-management directors. 73 
Moreover, critics claim that Blair and Stout overlook the impact of 
the stock market. 74   Boards cannot ignore the impact due to 
fluctuation in the stock prices. 75   The theory depends upon the 
conflicting interests between shareholders and non-shareholder 
constituencies.76  Blair and Stout assert that corporate law reflects 
their argument that it vests the directors with the exclusive power to 
manage the corporation and insulates them from shareholder 
interference or any other team member.77  The greater concern is 
whether boards actually function as the team production model says 
they should; in reality, a strong preference for short-term share price 
maximization binds directors because this is what most institutional 
shareholders want.78  Thus, the problem with the team production 
model is that boards are not in fact independent at all and do not have 
board discretion, and directors do not and cannot behave the way the 
theory says they should.79 
Under U.S. corporate law, however, shareholders alone enjoy 
voting rights, information rights, and the right to bring derivative 
suits.80  Blair and Stout argue that, although shareholders alone have 
independence because the very large number of shareholders means 
81  The 
argument is not persuasive in terms of a normative claim, although 
the reality is such as they argue.  Furthermore, it is doubtful that the 
team production model provides the Board with any incentive to 
                                                          
73 Coates, supra note 72 at 845-47. 
74 Id. at 849. 
75 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.110 (1965) (arguing that boards and managers 
have an incentive to maximize the stock price, independently of any legal 
duty to do so, because a depressed stock price makes the corporation a 
potential 
 
76 See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 416-18 (detailing the 
relationship between shareholders and non-shareholders). 
77 Id. at 423-24. 
78 Id. at 428-30. 
79 David Millon, Team Production Theory: A Critical Appreciation, 
62 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 79, 80-81 (2014). 
80 Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 409 n.10. 
81 Id. at 434. 
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perform its duties conscientiously.82  Therefore, from the normative 
aspect, Bl  
 
 
From the normative and positive aspects, the nexus of contracts 
model is slightly ahead of the team production model. However, in 
terms of the discretionary powers of the Board of Directors, the 
director primacy model is somewhat further ahead. Proponents of the 
director primacy model claim that boards must be mostly free of 
shareholder interference to serve shareholder interests.83 
Stephen Bainbridge draws upon the theory of the firm (in 
contrast to the team production theory but in accordance with the 
nexus of contracts theory), arguing that shareholders alone, as 
opposed to other stakeholders, are the appropriate beneficiaries of 
director fiduciary duties.84  According to the director primacy model, 
directors are ultimately responsible for shareholder wealth 
maximization, rather than promoting stakeholder interests,85 and the 
interests of shareholders should prevail over those of any other 
constituencies. 86   Additionally, directors (rather than managers, 
shareholders, and stakeholders) are completely responsible for 
control over the corporation.87  Bainbridge recognizes that directors 
Republic. 88  Under the 
s 
of contracts; rather, Bainbridge argues that the firm has a nexus of its 
contracts which is a board of directors well-equipped with the 
89  He argues that the powers of the Board of 
Directors are original and undelegated, and that neither shareholders 
                                                          
82 Meese, supra note 72, at 1665-66. 
83 See Kostant, supra note 72, at 693-94. 
84 Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 550. 
85 Id. at 572. 
86 Id. at 577-85. 
87 Id. at 550. 
88 Id. at 550-51, 560; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of 
Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 & n.28 (2002) 
 
89 E.g., Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 554-60. 
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-making authority.90  
The Board negotiates with and hires the various factors of production 
91  Thus, the Board of Directors, not shareholders, is
and should be in control of the corporation, exercising almost 
unconstrained authority to ensure corporate decision-making 
efficiency.  
Bainbridge argues that there is a core tension between the 
shareholder voting rights are one of the mechanisms that hold 
directors accountable.92  
board decisions might weaken the core of corporate governance and 
shifting the power of decision-making to shareholders is undesirable 
in itself in accordance with director primacy.93  As a positive matter, 
Bainbridge contends that the director-centered model of the firm 
matches both modern corporate practice and the structure of most 
state laws (particularly Delaware, the dominant model).94  As noted 
above, however, director primacy might also face difficulties because 
of CEO domination and performance of some functions required 
under corporate governance.  Part III addresses such functions and 
the reality in which the shift of authority to the independent board 
has weakened boards.  Thus, CEOs find themselves in an extremely 
powerful position. 
 
III. MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 
This part first addresses the functions that corporate law asserts a 
board of directors should perform and then argues that a board of 
directors, in a large public corporation, is ineffective for performing 
such functions.  Boards of public corporations primarily have two 
areas: monitoring the activities of the corporate executives and 
95   
                                                          
90 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 11-12 (stating shareholder wealth 
maximization is the law in the United States). 
91 Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 560. 
92 Id. at 555-60.  
93 Id. at 557-59. 
94 Id. at 568-74; see also Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 105-53 
 
95 Compare, Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 790 805 (2011) (discussing the dual monitoring 
and management functions of the modern board), with STEPHEN M. 
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management responsibilities essentially involve making the final 
decision on major issues, such as issuing dividends, pursuing mergers 
and acquisitions, and the like.96  
responsibilities primarily involve appointing the CEO and evaluating 
the management team.97  
has various degrees of autonomy and control in relation to the 
98 
Modern corporate law includes 
board, which usually requires the Board to have independent 
directors.  
personal or financial relationship with the firm. 99   Part-time, or 
independent directors, are arguably never equipped to make 
corporate policy or manage the corporate business.100  Will they be 
ill-equipped in the context of monitoring?  Melvin Eisenberg 
challenged the insider-dominated boards of the day and argued that 
the modern board should serve as an independent monitor that works 
to protect shareholder interests.101  Eisenberg asserted that there is 
one function that the Board can perform better than any other 
corporate group:  
102  Through the notion of 
the monitoring board, Eisenberg tried to change the reality so that it 
was not the Board, but the executives who actually managed the 
                                                                                                                
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 49 50, 
61 (2012) (indicating that the literature identifies three functions for the 
public board: (1) monitoring and disciplining management, (2) providing 
advice and guidance to managers, and (3) providing a network of useful 
political and business contacts.). 
96 Alces, supra note 95, at 798. 
97 See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 
265, 269 71 (1997). 
98 Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 559-60 (from a legal perspective, any 
control a CEO has is delegated from the Board to the CEO  the Board 
ultimately retains control.). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2013). 
99 Daniele Marchesani, The Concept of Autonomy and the 
Independent Director of Public Corporations, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 315, 
322-23 (2005). 
100 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in 
the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. 
REV. 375, 387 (1975). 
101 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976). 
102 Id. at 170. 
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corporation.103  By the end of the 1970s, the ideal board became a 
monitoring board rather than a merely nominal body.104  If a board is 
free of conflicts of interests that is, free of ties to the CEO then it 
hus, 
notion of the independent monitoring board 
now dominates corporate governance.105 
Therefore, the independent board monitors executive officers, 
including CEOs, to ensure that they run the corporation for the 
benefit of the shareholders.106 Indeed, increasing Board independence 
has been the key to corporate governance reform for the past three 
decades.  In designing a monitoring board for a public corporation, 
federal and state laws, as well as public listing rules, have required 
certain functions.  After the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 effectively required an independent 
audit committee. 107   Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 stipulated that public 
corporations must have independent audit and compensation 
committees. 108   The rules of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ) influenced most large public corporations to have a 
majority of independent directors on the full board and on several 
oversight committees.109  However, these reforms have not improved 
                                                          
103 Id. at 140. 
104 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the 
United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1518 (2007). 
105 See also Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 53. 
106 Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed 
on Institutional Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 17 (2004) (describing the 
 
107 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 303, 116 Stat. 
745, 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201). 
108 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78j-3). 
109 See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the 
Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 282-88 (2006) (describing the NYSE requirements). 
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board performance, which some commentators have pointed out.110  
Thus, in terms of the efficacy of corporate governance, repeated 
regulatory efforts to increase board independence have unfortunately 
proved futile or even counterproductive. 
First, the independent monitoring board has been criticized for 
being ineffective at performing even the most basic monitoring 
function.111  Directors inevitably rely heavily on executive officers 
for the information they use in monitoring tasks. 112   Moreover, 
directors from outside the corporation or the industry only have 
information, and therefore have to depend heavily on executive 
officers for information about the corporation and the industry. 
Furthermore, they have limited time, expertise, and attention to 
 Ironically, 
the shift to the independent board has weakened boards and, 
moreover, placed the CEO in an extremely powerful position in a 
corporation.  
Directors are at a disadvantage in monitoring executive officers, 
because they cannot avoid relying heavily on those officers for the 
information they use to monitor themselves.  This problem with the 
monitoring structure became apparent particularly during the recent 
financial crisis.113  Independent monitoring boards could not discover 
any serious problems with the business decisions that executive 
officers were making and, thus, could not prevent the collapse of 
                                                          
110 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation 
Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. 
CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors and 
Stock Market Prices: The New Corporate Governance Paradigm 34 43 
(Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 301, 2006) (showing several 
studies have found no correlation between corporate performance and board 
See, e.g., Catherine M. Daily & 
Dan R. Dalton, Board of Directors Leadership and Structure: Control and 
Performance Implications, 17 ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
65, 75 (1993) (indicating some studies find a positive impact from increased 
board independence.). See, e.g., April Klein, Firm Performance and Board 
Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 300 01 (1998) (other studies find 
a negative impact from increased board independence.).  
111 Fisch, supra note 97, at 268-70. 
112 Alces, supra note 95, at 795. 
113 See generally Lisa Fairfax, Government Governance and the Need 
to Reconcile Government Regulation with Board Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 1692 (2011). 
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financial firms.  As Lawrence Mitchell pointed out, the CEO can 
easily manipulate or suppress the information provided to the Board 
because the position is typically the sole, or nearly sole, source of 
information for the Board.114  Thus, most boards are rather passive, 
because CEOs dominate the Board and employ their power in their 
own interests.115  If the Board remains passive, there is no one who 
actively questions s or 
decisions.  If boards had successfully monitored serious events, such 
as the recent financial crisis, and relied on their independent 
information, they might have been able to challenge the CEOs and 
management on the long-term wisdom of these decisions.  It is 
difficult to provide independent directors with strong incentives to 
monitor executive officers more carefully.116 
In terms of management function, most boards of modern public 
corporations are now composed of mostly independent directors; 
however, it has been general practice for the CEO to serve as the 
chairman of the Board of Directors.117  That means the CEO sets the 
board meetings.  In most instances, the 
management function, because they know more about the day-to-day 
business of the firm as well as its relationship with the various 
corporate constituencies.  As noted above, the Board must rely 
heavily on inside directors for information and judgment, and the 
make independent business decisions.  Independent directors are ill-
equipped to second-guess the decisions of the CEO and the 
                                                          
114 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational 
Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOKLYN. L. 
REV. 1313, 1350 (2005). 
115 Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-
Captured Board  The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 
127, 127 (1996). See generally Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside 
Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 
90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 898 903, 913 17 (1996) (cataloging the many ways 
in which CEOs dominate outside directors). 
116 Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside 
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875 
(1991). 
117 See Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 
1950 2000: Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 351 
(2000). 
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management team.118  Further, outside directors may avoid asking 
complex questions and presenting strategic alternatives.119  Thus, the 
independent board is not well-equipped to make final decisions and 
must rely heavily on the information and judgment of others who are 
more involved in the everyday business of the corporation.  
Therefore, it is not assumed to be the outside board members but 
the executive officers who work most directly and closely with 
various constituencies and perform the mediation function in the firm.  
Contrary to the claims of the team production model, boards of most 
public corporations do not serve as independent mediators of 
conflicting interests between shareholders and other stakeholders. 
The Board does not and cannot perform a meaningfully independent 
role in significant decision-making. Senior officers, through the 
largely decide the day-to-day business of the corporation.  Even if a 
corporation moves to the adoption of supermajority independent 
boards, the CEO, paradoxically, continues to be the significant 
decision-maker in the modern public corporation.  Corporate 
governance theory generally ignores this reality, at least for public 
corporations.  
The team production model assumes that directors actively and 
continuously mediate among the various interests of shareholder, 
labor, management, community, and any other stakeholders.  As 
some commentators point out, mediating among corporate 
corresponding obligations.120  However, the modern part-time board 
member simply is not expected to take such an active role in 
management.  While in the real world, senior officers know much 
more about such a role than the Board does and often negotiate the 
n senior 
officers for independent monitoring to adjust and mediate the 
                                                          
118 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 116, at 889 (observing that outside 
directors rarely exercise their judgment today, not only because they lack the 
. 
119 Id. 
120 Alces, supra note 95, at 801. 
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different claims of different constituencies.121  In sum, independent 
directors are ill-equipped to serve as mediators of diverse and 
conflicting corporate constituency interests.  Thus, the mediator of 
such constituency interests, if any, is not the Board but the CEO, 
even if the Board is assumed to mediate between corporate 
constituencies under the team production theory. Therefore, it may be 
unconvincing to argue that the Board is in a particularly good 
position to perform the mediation function. Hence, the team 
production model might not signify the reality in the firm. 122  
Additionally, in the real world, director primacy might also face the 
same difficulties for the same reason of CEO domination.123 
 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS: 
ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE MODEL 
One of the key tensions within any system of corporate 
governance is the necessary trade-off between authority and 
accountability. 124   In that case, the underlying issue in corporate 
governance is the need for balance between the authority granted to 
shareholders seek.125  Bainbridge also argues that there is an inherent 
primacy model, such that when shareholders provide capital to a 
                                                          
121 See, e.g., Anne Tucket Nees, 
Oversight Liability within the Corporate Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 251 
(2010). 
122 Additionally, as noted in Part III, the team production theory 
opposes the structure of modern U.S. corporate law in which shareholders 
alone enjoy the right of electing directors and the corporate objective of 
shareholder wealth maximization. 
123 See Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 567, 569 (regarding the Board as 
both the ultimate monitor and a body that exercises fiat in the corporation). 
124 E.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Bruner on Director Primacy and Other 
Pure Theories of Corporate Governance, businessassociationsblog.com 
(Sept. 4, 2007), http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/ 
lawandbusiness/comments/brunerondirectorprimacyandotherpuretheoriesofc
orporategovernance/ (stating that corporate governance reflects the balancing 
 
 
125 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES122-23 
(10th ed. 2007). 
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corporation they implicitly contract for the directors to pursue 
shareholder wealth maximization.126  Thus, we first have to discuss 
whether the governance structure ensures that the accountability will 
 
Another factor to consider is that the economic crisis exposed 
substantial issues which stemmed from the connection of CEO 
compensation incentives with short-term gains.  This problem has 
become more serious due to the passivity of modern public boards, 
he/she provides.  The corporate governance structure must be 
reformed to read just such an incentive structure in favor of the long-
term well-being of the corporation.  George Dent argues that 
shareholder rights must be expanded to achieve the goal of 
addressing the issue of CEO domination.127  However, transferring 
power from CEOs to shareholders will not necessarily solve this 
problem.  Proposals to increase shareholder power are criticized for 
being ineffective and inadequate partly because shareholders are at 
an informational disadvantage and partly because they tend to be 
indifferent to their voting power and to another kind of shareholder 
power, such as derivative suits and information rights.128  If the goal 
of corporate governance reform is to increase the long-term well-
being and value of the corporation, some shareholders may have a 
short-term bias that prevents CEOs from effectively achieving this 
long-term goal. 
As noted above, independent mediators of conflicting interests in 
most public corporations are not a board of directors but CEOs. In a 
normative light, the Board should still serve as both a monitor for 
manager that makes a final decision on fundamental corporate issues 
through considering such constitu  The team 
production theory has provided the perspective that the Board of 
Directors should assume the role of a mediating hierarch among all 
                                                          
126 Bainbridge supra note 16, at, 605, 573 (arguing the key to 
corporate governance lies in maintaining the proper balance of authority and 
accountability). 
127 See, George W. Dent, Academics in Wonderland: The Team 
Production and Director Primacy and Models of Corporate Governance, 44 
HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1273 (2008). 
128 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990) (this is often referred to as a collective action 
problem). 
SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 
92                    INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS VOL. 14.1 
 
constituencies, including shareholders.  Thus, this theory presents a 
substantial 
corporate governance.  Incidentally, the director primacy model is 
concerned with the allocation of power within the firm, but has little 
to say about how that power is to be used other than requiring that it 
be used to maximize shareholder wealth.129 
I propose that any corporate governance reform must focus 
primarily on promoting the long-term well-being of the corporation, 
transparency).  In light of this goal, I will examine a proposal for 
corporate governance reforms, that is, the 
(ESV) 
currently accepted in the United Kingdom. 
 
 
The U.K. Companies Act 2006 (the Act) attempts to reconcile 
-term and 
stakeholder concerns. 130   This legal duty requires directors to 
promote the long-term success of the corporation for the benefit of 
the shareholders as a whole, but in doing so, directors must consider 
the list of stakeholder interests described in section 172(1) of the 
Act. 131   This is referred to as the ESV approach132  of corporate 
governance, which merges elements of the shareholder primacy and 
stakeholder models.  The Company Law Review (CLR), which 
                                                          
129 See Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 792 (contrasting Blair & Stout, 
Bainbridge states he did not approach the Board of Directors from a 
the director primacy model.). 
130 See also Paul L. Davies, Enlightened Shareholder Value and the 
New Responsibilities of Directors (Oct. 4, 2005), 
http://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1710014/94-
Enlightened_Shareholder_Value_and_the_New_Responsibilities_of_Directo
rs1.pdf (arguing the ESV approach is not very different from a shareholder 
approach). 
131 See COMPANIES ACT 2006, c. 46, § 712 (U.K.). 
132 Id.; Daniel Attenborough, The Company Law Reform Bill: An 
, 27 
COMPANY LAW 162, 165 (2006).  
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worked on the Act, accepted the concept of the ESV as a 
fundamental principle in corporate governance.133 
 
1. DIRECTORS  FIDUCIARY DUTY 
The core of the ESV principle is embodied in section 172 of the 
Act, which defines the fiduciary duties of directors:  
 A director of a company must act in the way he considers, 
in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so 
have regard (amongst other matters) to  
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
 
(c) 
with suppliers, customers, and others, 
(d) 
and the environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation 
for high standards of business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the 
134 
shareholder who is interested in the long-term well-being and 
performance of the corporation and its social and environmental 
impact.135  Under this ESV approach, directors, who are ultimately 
required to promote shareholder interests, must consider the factors 
 The 
fundamental elements of the ESV model are:  (1) an explicit focus on 
long-term shareholder value as the goal of the corporation and (2) a 
requirement that directors consider the impact of their decisions on 
section 172 to promote the success of the corporation, however, on 
                                                          
133 See Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: 
older Value 
Approach,  29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577, 579 (2007). 
134 Id. at 591. 
135 See Andrew Keay, Moving towards Stakeholderism? Constituency 
Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder Value, and More: Much Ado about Little, 
22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1, 40 (2011). 
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the premise that no change in the corporate decision-maker (i.e., the 
stakeholders is made at all.136 In terms of the last premise, under the 
Act, directors remain directly accountable only to shareholders, and 
the Board is maintained as the decision-making authority of the 
corporation. 137  Thus, the Act defines shareholders as the sole 
corporate constituency entitled to elect directors, bring derivative 
suits, and authorize interested transactions. 
The 
formulated in terms of the notion that shareholder value depends 
138 Hence, 
although section 172 of the Act, which includes the ESV approach, 
addressed.139  us 
also consider the interests of other key constituencies as long as such 
consideration promotes the success of the corporation for the benefits 
of its shareholders.140  A major concern here was whether to uphold 
the notion of the shareholder primacy approach or whether a 
for this approach.141  Contrary to the claims of the ESV approach, the 
approach that directors should consider all 
relevant constituencies interests equally, which include those of 
shareholders, and that directors should give primacy to non-
shareholder constituencies, even sacrificing shareholders  interests in 
                                                          
136 See Virginia Harper Ho, 
Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 59, 79 (2010). 
137 See generally COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 131. 
138 See Keay, supra note 133, at 579. 
139 See Andrew Keay, Enlightened Shareholder Value, The Reform of 
the Duties of Corporation Directors and the Corporate Objective, LLOYD S 
MAR. COM.L. Q. 335, 339 (2006); see also Keay supra note 135, at 2, 18. 
140 See John Lowry, The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: 
Bridging the Accountability Gap through Efficient Disclosure, 68 
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 607, 616 (2009). 
141 See Gavin Kelly & John Parkinson, The Conceptual Foundations 
of the Company: A Pluralist Approach, THE POL. ECON. OF THE COMPANY 
(
throughout). 
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case of a conflict in interests between shareholders and non-
shareholders. 142   Although the CLR recognized the merits of the 
stakeholder approach, it did not recommend its adoption and finally 
chose a modified model, which is the ESV model. 
 
2. NARRATIVE REPORTING 
The U.K. has expanded 
  In 
section 417(2) of the Act, the statutory objective of the business 
review is declared, which holds that directors, not the corporation, 
are required to compile a business review to inform shareholders of 
the corporation and help them assess and evaluate how the directors 
have performed their duty under section 172. 143   Thus, the Act 
requires directors in public corporations to recognize and report on 
the non-exhaustive list of factors specified in section 172(1)as part of 
the comprehensive disclosures to investors.144  The business review 
description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the 
145  Further, i
main trends and factors likely to affect the future development and 
performance of the listed 146 Specifically, the 
business review for a listed corporation must include information 
community issues, and essential contractual arrangements. 147  The 
analysis in the business review must be based on both financial and 
non-financial key performance indicators (KPIs).148  The narrative 
in the United Kingdom 
possibly goes further than the narrative reporting system in the 
United States, which is more focused on financial performance.  The 
                                                          
142 Id. 
143 See COMPANIES ACT 2006, c. 46, § 417(2) (U.K.). 
144 Id. 
regime are exempted from the business review requirement).  
145 Id. at § 417(3)(a)-(b). 
146 Id. at § 417(4)-(5). 
147 Id. at§ 417(5) (if the business review does not include the relevant 
information, it must include a statement detailing which kind of information 
is not contained therein.). 
148 Id. at § 417(6). 
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increasing, and the U.K. government in early 2012 proposed a 
strategic 
r 149 
Thus, in August 2013, the Companies Reform Regulations 2013 
amended the Act which implements the strategic report and the 
417 of the Act. 150   All U.K. corporations, except those that are 
r annual report.  The strategic report is to 
cover the same material as the old business review, such as, in the 
case of listed corporations, principal risks and uncertainties, and KPIs. 
The new strategic report, in relation to strategy and business model, 
the gender of the directors, senior managers, employees of the 
corporation, and human rights issues and policies, requires listed 
corporations to provide additional disclosures.151 
As seen from sections 172, 417, and 414A-D of the Act, the U.K. 
corporate law reforms require boards to justify their decisions in 
terms of long-term shareholder value and stakeholder interests, and 
to disclose risks impacting stakeholders.152  By doing so, the U.K. 
has made management at least indirectly accountable to stakeholders.  
The factors listed in section 172(1) and the strategic report and 
 which requests compliance with such sections, will 
allow directors to defend any bona fide business decision aimed at 
promoting the success of the corporation.153 However, section 463 of 
the Act causes a director to be liable for compensating the 
                                                          
149 See COMPANIES ACT 2006, c. 46, § 414A (U.K.) (In August 2013, 
the Companies Reform Regulations 2013 amended the Companies Act 2006, 
ss review in 
the now superseded section 417 of the Act.); see § 414C(2)(4) (the Strategic 
Report now incorporates the former requirements of the superseded 
tegy, business model, and gender diversity on the 
Board.).  
150 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 149, at § 414A. 
151 Id. at §414C(8). 
152 Id. at §§ 172, 417, 414(A)-(D). 
153 Id. at § 172(1); COMPANIES ACT 2006 (STRATEGIC REPORTS AND 
DIRECTOR S REPORT) REGULATIONS 2013 S.I. 2008/393, (§ 414C(1)) (U.K.). 
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corporation for any of its own losses if the director knowingly makes 
statement, or summary financial statements. 154   In sum, the U.K. 
compliance with such sections and to simultaneously push 
corporations in the direction of greater social responsibility.155 
 
V. OTHER PROGRESS 
In 2010 the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) published The 
U.K. Corporate Governance Code (the Code  as updated in 2014), 
which sets out standards of good practice for listed corporations on 
board composition and on development, remuneration, shareholder 
relations, accountability, and audit.156  Additionally, in 2011 the FRC 
published the 157  The 
guidance is intended to assist companies in applying the principles of 
the Code, which relates primarily to Sections A and B that deal with 
the leadership and effectiveness of the Board, per Listing Rule 
9.8.6.158  In the case of a listed company, its annual financial report 
must include (1) a statement of how the listed company has applied 
the Main Principles set out in the Code in a manner that would enable 
shareholders to evaluate the application of the principles, and (2) a 
statement as to whether the listed company has complied with all 
relevant provisions set out in the Code or has not complied with all 
relevant provisions set out in the Code.159  If the company has not 
complied with all relevant provisions, it must include a statement 
setting out those provisions with which it has not complied and the 
                                                          
154 See COMPANIES ACT 2006, c. 46, § 463, (U.K.). 
155 See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third 
Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 
CORNELL INT L L. J. 493, 500 (2005). 
156 See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CODE (2014), 
157 See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON BOARD 
EFFECTIVENESS (2011). 
158 See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, LISTING RULE 9.8.4 (May 
16, 2014) https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR/9/8.html  
159 See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 157, at 9.8.6 (5) 
and (6).  
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-compliance.160  This means the Listing 
Rules apply the so-called comply or explain  rule. 
 
VI. E.U. CORPORATE REFORM 
In addition to the U.K. movement, there is E.U. corporate reform.  
The Council of the European Commission adopted Directive 
2013/34/EU on  disclosure of non-financial 
information.161  If a company is large (i.e., listed and non-listed, but 
having more than 250 employees), the Board must prepare a 
management report containing the analysis including both financial 
and non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the 
particular business, including information relating to environmental 
and employee matters.162 
According to E.U. Directive 2014/95/EU, which amended the 
said Accounting Directive, the Board must disclose information to 
the extent necessary for an understanding of the undertaking's 
development, performance, position and impact of its activity, 
relating to environmental, social and employee matters, respect for 
human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. 163   Moreover, 
large listed companies shall also disclose information regarding the 
diversity of the Board.164  The required disclosure must also include 
-
mentioned matters, the results of these policies, and the risks related 
to these matters, and how the company manages those risks.165  The 
transparency and performance on environmental and social matters, 
and therefore, to contribute effectively to long-term economic growth 
                                                          
160 FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 156. 
161 Council Directive 182/19, art.19, 2013 O.J. (L182/19) (EC). 
162 Id. 
163 Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2014 as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large undertakings and groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330/1). 
19(a); see European Commission Memoranda MEMO/14/301, Disclosure of 
Non-financial and Diversity Information by Large Companies and Groups  
Frequently Asked Questions (April 15, 2014). 
164 See Article 20 (g) of Directive 2014/95/EU. 
165 See European Commission Memoranda, supra note 163. See also 
Article 29a of Directive 2014/95/EU. 
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166  More transparency will help companies better 
manage the opportunities and non-financial risks.167  These directives 
are aimed at complementing the narrative reporting regulations in the 
United Kingdom.168 
regulations, as mentioned above, U.K. listed companies will be 
model, human rights and gender diversity in their strategic report, 
and providing information on greenhouse gas emissions in their 
169 
Expansion of the disclosure of financial and non-financial 
information and the narrative reporting system that has been adopted 
in the United Kingdom and the E.U. are helping increase the 
accountability and transparency of the decision-making process in 
terms of considering multi-stakeholder interests.  The recent progress 
in this regard should be positively evaluated in terms of corporate 
governance. 
 
 
Is it acceptable under U.S. corporate law that directors are able 
to or must consider the interests of other constituencies besides 
shareholders?  Is such consideration in conflict with the notion of 
shareholder wealth maximization?  
Under Delaware law, the fiduciary duty of loyalty requires 
directors to act in the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders,170 and most states have the same or almost the same 
statutes.  However, under U.S. corporate law, directors should also 
consider the interests of other corporate constituencies to the extent 
that those interests meet the best interests of the shareholders. Thus, 
the above description is like the ESV approach used in the United 
                                                          
166 See European Commission Memoranda, supra note 163. 
167 Id. 
168 International Accounting Standards Board, Regulations 
implementing EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive published (Sept. 16, 
2017, 11:09AM), https://www.iasplus.com/en-gb/news/2016/12/regulations-
implementing-eu-non-financial-reporting-directive-published. 
169 Id. 
170 ATR-Kim Eng. Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 
3783520, at 16 (Del Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 
510 (Del. 1983)). 
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Kingdom.  
framework for addressing the above questions. 
Elhauge argues that managers have, and should have, discretion 
under corporate law to sacrifice profits in the public 
interest,171essentially, the interests of non-shareholders.172  Elhauge 
corporate profits to further public interest goals that are not required 
173 and that the existence of managerial discretion to sacrifice 
profits in the public interest is rather socially desirable. 174  
Additionally, this would be true even if the objective of corporate 
entails the business judgment rule.  According to Elhauge, the 
business judgment rule in effect leaves managers with latent 
discretion to sacrifice profits in the public interest, which discretion 
Elhauge argues is socially desirable.175  Thus, the business judgment 
rule protects most managerial decisions that involve potential 
shareholder stakeholder conflicts of interest. 176  In support of his 
argument, Elhauge points to the so-called constituency statutes that 
many states enacted which authorize managers explicitly to consider 
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies and the American Law 
Principles of Corporate Governance, which authorize 
boards of directors to devote a reasonable amount of resources to 
                                                          
171 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 739 (2005). See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, 
CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA S NEWEST EXPORT (2001); Cynthia 
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999); Ian B. Lee, Is There a Cure 
 42 AM. BUS. L. J. 65(2005); Shlensky v. 
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (leading case on profit-
sacrificing decisions). 
172 Elhauge, supra note 171, at 744. 
173 Id. at 763. 
174 Id. at 738 40. 
175 Id. 
176 See id. at 775; see also Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an 
Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 181 
(2008). 
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entails a net economic loss.177  Further, Elhauge refers to Delaware 
case law on takeovers, particularly Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co., 178  
interests are not a controlling factor. 179   According to Elhauge, 
er the business judgment rule, courts are extraordinarily willing 
least in the short run) on the grounds that they may conceivably 
180  More or less any 
decision to sacrifice profits has a conceivable link to long-term 
profits; therefore, this suffices to give managers substantial de facto 
discretion to sacrifice profits in the public interest.181  Elhauge further 
argues that when managers sacrifice profits in the public interest, 
182  
Consequently, he suggests that maximizing shareholder welfare is 
not the same thing as maximizing shareholder profits.183 
The United States and the United Kingdom have the same 
structure of dispersed share ownership and well-developed securities 
markets and depend upon a similar stock market for corporate control.  
Moreover, in both countries, stock ownership has become 
increasingly concentrated in institutions such as mutual funds or 
pension funds.  Indeed, there are many reasons why such a 
stakeholder-oriented regulatory shift is unlikely.  Per some 
commentators, key differences between the dominant institutional 
investors in the United Kingdom (i.e., pension funds) and the United 
environments, make stakeholder-oriented corporate reform less likely 
in the United States.184  However, I do not believe these differences 
are crucial to introducing the ESV approach to the United States. 
Moreover, the regulatory framework for the exercise of 
                                                          
177 Elhauge, supra note 171, at 763 66 (citing 1 Am. Law Inst., 
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations  
§ 2.01(b)(3) (1992)). 
178 Id. at 764 65 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 770-71. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 785. 
183 Id. at 783. 
184 Ho, supra note 136, at 79 80. 
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much more empowering as compared to the United States.185  The 
enhanced narrative reporting regime proposed in the United 
Kingdom has the objective of making a significant impact on the 
scrutiny, and engagement.  However, I am not suggesting that we 
 governance by 
achieving the narrative reporting regime and finally moving on to 
shareholder primacy.  Structural issues such as short-termism and the 
reliance on capital market gains, rather than long-term corporate 
 of engagement. Many 
institutional shareholders delegate investment management to asset 
managers, and their short-termism relationships with asset managers 
contribute to the short-term prospects of investment management.  I, 
rather, contend that the narrative reporting regime would ensure 
monitoring function and market discipline, which would ultimately 
improve corporate governance.  Moreover, such narrative reporting 
would enhance the communication between the Board and the CEO, 
and the corporation and all stakeholders thereby helping solve the 
asymmetric information problem. 
There might be criticisms to my argument explained above, 
ort-
termism, which caused the recent financial crisis.  First, there might 
be skepticism that narrative reporting is useful in avoiding such a 
crisis.  One commentator argues that the enhancement of corporate 
disclosure in narrative reporting would not likely have any significant 
impact on investor behavior, in terms of shareholder engagement, 
because investors probably use such disclosure not for engagement 
(especially institutional shareholders) but for trading decisions. 186  
However, assuming that we cannot completely change CEO 
domination and asymmetric information, the capital market must 
change in terms of socially responsible investment, and the 
enhancement of the norm of the ESV and the disclosure supporting 
such norm would surely lead to improvement in the accountability 
                                                          
185 CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER 
POWER 36 37 (2013). 
186 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically 
Examining the Impact of Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 1009 1011 (2014) (arguing that narrative reporting 
may be criticized as being too subjective and qualitative). 
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and sustainable growth of corporations, which would in turn lead to 
shareholder engagement. As noted above, I support the director 
primacy model wherein the Board is in control of the corporation.  
Hence, exercising almost unconstrained authority to ensure corporate 
decision-making efficiency.  Second, there might a question whether 
the ESV approach and narrative reporting infringe on 
traditional role as a central decision-
discretion might be constrained to some extent to perform fiduciary 
duty in terms of the ESV approach and disclosure of nonfinancial 
information.  However, the said framework would be intended not to 
empower shareholders or enhance shareholder activism, but to ensure 
the accountability of the directors, who have broad discretion.  Under 
the ESV model, directors still have broad discretion regarding which 
interests of constituencies they consider and how they consider such 
interests. 
To avoid a future financial crisis corporate governance reform 
must focus primarily on promoting the long-term well-being of the 
accountability and transparency.  For these purposes, I argue that a 
combination of the ESV approach and the narrative reporting system 
as used in United Kingdom187 would be a more effective approach to 
address this problem.  In terms of the norm, however, we should 
retain the director primacy model rather than the team production 
model, as we have to deal with the reality that boards depend heavily 
upon CEOs for corporate information, although they must perform a 
monitoring function.  There are difficulties in overcoming such a 
dilemma between director primacy and CEO domination.  In sum, it 
is incorrect to assume that only a board that is made up of 
independent or outside directors can monitor well because the way in 
which the monitoring function works within a corporation is different 
for each corporation. 188   Globalization trends related to 
communication between corporation and stakeholders, including 
189  Based on the 
idea that transparency will lead to sound management and 
                                                          
187 Id. 
188 See Gordon, supra note 104, at 1505 09. 
189 See, e.g., David Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in 
UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities, 10 (2009) (explaining that 
the UK government has proposed corporate transparency reforms in order to 
ardship role). 
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performance improvement, the E.U. believes that requiring the 
disclosure of non-financial information will lead to long-term 
corporate value.  Such a notion and system are sufficiently applicable 
to the U.S. model of corporate governance. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The current environment where corporations and the global 
economy operate presents an important opportunity for reform.190  It 
vernance reform on 
enhancing the long-term health and value of the corporation.  The 
for autonomous action.  The team production model is criticized for 
action.191  There is no single overriding theory, and strict adherence 
to any pure theory would not prove helpful.  the social and 
economic roles of the public corporations are so diverse and far-
reaching that we cannot expect any single concept to serve us well in 
192 
From the perspective of corporate reform, we must ensure that 
the functions that public corporations are expected to perform under 
corporate governance will work well as such.  I have pointed out 
above that the shift to the independent board, which has weakened 
the Board as a monitoring body, has caused a problem.  However, my 
proposal of promoting the long-term well-being of the corporation, 
                                                          
190 See e.g., Bruce E. Aronson, Japanese Corporate Governance 
Reform: A Comparative Perspective, 11 Hastings Bus. L. J. 85 (2015). In 
2014, the Japanese Diet passed a bill amending the corporate law. According 
to the amended corporate law, no outside directors are mandatory in a 
corporation with a board of corporate auditors, which is adopted in a vast 
majority of listed corporations. If the corporation lacks outside directors, the 
 meeting why 
it is reasonable for the corporation to have no outside directors at all. This is 
often explained such that Japanese corporate law follows the UK style of the 
in corporate law but in the listing regulation. 
191 Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Theory and Review 
of Board Decisions, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 87, 89 (2014).
192 Id. 
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transparency seems to be still ineffective for addressing this problem.  
We must keep in mind that the Board should not perform the 
monitoring function on its own.  The stock market, gatekeepers,193 
and social norms must supplement corporate governance, 194  and 
boards must perform it.  The narrative reporting that is currently 
expanding in the United Kingdom and the E.U. might help enhance 
the monitoring function that the stock market can perform.  If a third-
which I would recommend, then such a new gatekeeper would work 
for corporate governance.  Role allocation is necessary for ensuring 
the monitoring function for a corporation. 
 
                                                          
193 See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE 
PROFESSIONS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
194 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1253-1292 (1999) (discussing the role of social norms 
in several key areas of corporate law, including fiduciary duties, corporate 
governance, and takeovers). See also Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1721 
(2001) (arguing that firm-specific fairness norms promote efficiency). 
